Designing for and Living with NATs and Firewalls

Protocol Design – S-38.3157

“The primary purpose of firewalls has always been to shield buggy code from bad guys.”

Steve Bellovin, IETF Security AD
Reminder: Internet Architecture

- Transport and application protocols operate end-to-end
  - Port numbers: addressing of processes (applications)
  - Network-components and topology are invisible
  - All functions performed end-to-end

An IP Network: Application’s View

- Source IP Address: 1.2.3.4
- Source Port Number: 51000
- Destination IP Address: 5.6.7.8
- Destination Port Number: 80
- Protocol ID: TCP
An IP Network: Router’s View

Key Concepts of the Internet Architecture

Hosts know nothing about the network.

Routers know nothing about applications.
The Internet in the good ol’ times…

…and today.
Fencing off (Sub)Networks in the Internet (1)

- Because they do not mix
- Issue 1: Technical incompatibility because of addressing
  - Historic motivation: lack of IPv4 addresses
  - Network Address (and Port) Translator (NAT, NAPT)
  - More general problem: translating between different addressing realms
  - Different example: parallel operation of IPv6 and IPv4

```
        A               "GW"            B
Network          Network          Realm 1          Realm 2
Realm 1          Realm 2

Address Type 1   Mapping         Address Type 2

Representation   of A in Realm 2
```

Fencing off (Sub)Networks in the Internet (2)

- Issue 2: Different levels of trustworthiness
  - Firewalls: “outside” vs. “inside” of corporate networks
  - Sometimes semi-trusted (“demilitarized”) zone (DMZ)
  - Dedicated devices for an entire subnet
  - Complemented by host firewalls
    - Minimize the amount of code that needs to work properly for effective defense

```
A  Corporate            Internet
    Network          FW
    DMZ
    Servers (mail, web, etc.)
          FW  B
```
A Sample Network Setup

Recap: “Security Devices” for IP Networks

- **Packet Filter**
  - (dis)allow forwarding of packets to/from certain addresses
  - Protect networks from stray traffic

- **Application Layer Gateway (ALG) / Proxy**
  - control (and police) communications at application layer

- **Firewall**
  - Combination of the above
  - protect internal resources against access from the outside

- **Network Address Translator (NAT)**
  - minimize required fraction of “Internet” address space
  - hide internal IP addresses
  - perform packet filtering for unknown traffic
Classifying Traffic: The E(vil)-Bit

- Key question: how to identify malicious or other unwanted traffic
- Potentially intense processing required per packet
  - Source + destination IP addresses and port numbers, protocol type
  - Stateful packet inspection even more expensive
- Solution: RFC 3514 (1 April 2003)
  - “The Security Bit in the IPv4 Header”
  - Straightforward traffic identification
  - Fail-safe, easy to implement
  - E == 1: packet has evil content
  - E == 0: packet is ok
  - Firewalls simply discard evil packets
  - Extension for IPv6: “evil strength”

Classifying Traffic (2)

- Traditional approach: quintuple:
  (src IP address, dst IP address, protocol, src port, dst port)
  - Generally used for flow identification
- Hope to identify traffic as “legitimate”
- Issues
  - IP addresses often largely meaningless
  - Attackers also know what may be considered legitimate
    - E.g., src port 20 for ftp-data
  - Dynamic ports
  - IPSec protected traffic: ports become invisible
  - Application layer multiplexing
  - Future transport protocols?
IP Layer: Packet Filter

- **Packet Filter**
  - Corporate Network
  - Internet
  - **Packet filter spec**
    - Source, destination IP address
    - Protocol (UDP, TCP, ICMP)
    - Source, destination port
    - Direction of traffic
    - May be dynamically configured.
Stateful Packet Inspection

Application Layer Gateway
Summary: Firewalls

- Packet filters, enforcing packet altering/forwarding policies
  - Filter specification: Usually statically configured
  - Most configurations disallow packets for "non-standard ports"
- Stateful packet inspection
  - Detect transport or application context of packets
  - Dynamically adapt filter specification
- Application layer gateways
  - Terminate connections: act as transparent or explicitly visible proxies
  - Monitor connection: parse contents of application protocols
    - Functioning precludes end-to-end security!
  - Dynamically adapt filter specification
- Policies may be applied at all layers
**Network Address Translators**

- Intermediate systems that can translate addresses (and port numbers) in IP packets
  - Often used to map global addresses to address/port number combination of hosts in a corporate network

- Different motivations
  - Efficient usage of address space
    - Share one globally unique address
    - Use a private address space in the enterprise (10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x, …)
  - Security
    - Make internal host inaccessible from the public Internet
    - Hide addresses / address structure

- Include dynamically configured packet filters, stateful packet inspection

**Network (+Port) Address Translators (NAT)**
Network Address Translators

Operation of NA(P)Ts

- NATs usually only one-way permeable for initiating connections
  - From private to public network
  - Other direction limited to statically pre-configured addresses

- NATs create address/port number mappings
  - Mappings are usually created dynamically, e.g. on connection setup
  - Static configurations also possible
  - Works best with connection-oriented communication
  - Most common case: TCP connection from client-server sessions
    - Client in private address space, server in public Internet
  - NATs have to keep state for mappings that are tied to “connections”
    - To allow for traffic in the opposite direction to pass

- Which traffic is allowed back in depends on NAT type
  - Important for UDP traffic (i.e. media streams)
"Full Cone" NAT

- Outbound packets establish temporary address/port binding
- Any host may respond to mapped address/port
- Incoming packets are dropped when no binding exists

```
10.0.0.101
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.102
```

```
10.0.0.100:12836 <-> 48.7.29.160:61795
```

---

“(Port) Restricted Cone” NAT

- Outbound packets establish temporary address/port binding
- Incoming packets are dropped when no binding exists
- Binding valid only for destination IP address (and optionally port)
- Packets from other hosts (and ports) are dropped

```
10.0.0.101
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.102
```

```
10.0.0.100:12836 <-> 48.7.29.160:61795;
   Allowed from 134.102.218.236(:32768)
```

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“Symmetric” NAT

- Port Restricted Cone NAT behavior
- Different bindings for different destinations
- Drop incoming packets when no appropriate binding present

Internet

10.0.0.101  10.0.0.0.1  10.0.0.102

134.102.218.236  48.7.29.160

10.0.0.100:12836 ↔ 48.7.29.160:61795; for 134.102.218.236:5061
10.0.0.100:12836 ↔ 48.7.29.160:42123; for 194.25.159.110:18268

Some Assumptions for NATs and Firewalls

- Applications follow client-server paradigm
  - Communications are usually invoked from the inside

- Traffic is self-describing
  - Example: applications use well-defined ports
  - Example: TCP ACK bit indicates established connection

- Connection-oriented protocols (e.g. TCP) dominate
  - Beginning and end of communication session can be identified

- Communications from the outside limited to a few servers
  - Often placed in a DMZ
Some Issues with Firewalls and NATs (1)

- **Fragmentation**
  - Outbound: Fragmentation ID collision (unique per source IP address)
  - Inbound: Fragments cannot (easily) be forwarded (port numbers are missing)

- **Packet forwarding**
  - IPsec end-to-end does not work
  - ICMP state needed
  - Integrated service?

- **Configuring NATs / firewalls**
  - Inbound vs. outbound connections – what is inbound, what is outbound?
  - Per-endpoint restriction (sender, receiver) may be desirable
  - How to identify and authenticate users and their flows in a middlebox

Some Issues with Firewalls and NATs (2)

- **Running servers (on well-defined transport addresses)**
  - Firewalls: Allow specific transport addresses to be reachable ("www.tkk.fi:80")
  - NATs: Specify port forwarding for specific nodes
    - Port 80 of a public IP address is mapped to one particular private IP address
    - Issue: Only one entity per port number

- **Running peer (and peer-to-peer) protocols**
  - Firewalls: issue with dynamically assigned IP addresses
  - NATs: Port forwarding impossible: only one entity per port number
Some Issues with Firewalls and NATs (3)

- Major issue: Non-predictable addresses
  - Dynamically negotiated addresses during communications
  - Symmetric communication relationships with different client addresses
  - (Invocation of) communications from/to unknown peers

- Trivial example: FTP
  - Data transfer uses newly opened TCP connection (from server to client)
  - Client supplies parameters dynamically (valid only for limited period of time)
  - Firewall: who is prepared to receive incoming connections when?
  - NAT: address translation renders specified address unusable
    - Private address "leaks" to a public node
  - FTP remedy: passive mode → reverse connection setup direction
  - Implicit assumption: server resides in public address space and is not protected by a firewall

Some Issues with Firewalls and NATs (4)

- Non-trivial example: SIP-based telephony
  - Both peers may or many not be behind NATs/firewalls
  - Many peers may be behind the same NAT/firewall
  - Signaling (reachability) solved moderately well within SIP
  - One issue (out of many): Uses UDP-based media streams
  - No connection setup, no client-server relationship
  - Firewalls will drop packets: Phones allow specifying fixed port ranges
  - NATs will invalidate addresses

- Side issue: 10.0.0.5 ≠ 10.0.0.5 ?
  - Private address spaces are often the same (meant to be!)
  - Is a received address local (and thus valid) or remote (and hence not valid)?

Increasingly relevant for modern protocols beyond plain client-server!
Summary: Firewall and NAT Applicability

- Firewalls and NATs help against unwanted traffic from the outside
  - Denial-of-Service attacks, port scans, break-in attacks, worms
  - ALGs against viruses
- But: Firewalls and NATs may also prevent legitimate traffic
  - Evil effect on IP communications: Break end-to-end model
  - Have many implicit assumptions about protocols
  - Do not work well with a number of protocols
    - Including their security features
- Just one piece in a security portfolio, to be applied wisely
- Applications and protocols still need security
- Users and their behavior still pose a significant risk

But they are real and they will stay around!

Dealing with Firewalls and NATs

- [Write only client-server protocols and place the server in the open Internet — or something similar…]
- Application Layer Gateways
- Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM)
- Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs (STUN*)
- Travel Using Relay NAT (TURN*)
- Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE*)

*) Unilateral Self-address fixing (UNSAF) considerations (RFC 3424)
Application Layer Gateways (ALGs)

- Gateway system with application intelligence
  - Co-located with NAT/firewall/router

- Different configurations
  - Transparent/Non-transparent
  - Fixes protocol messages by adapting address in different fields

Corporate Intranet

H

Internet

SIP UA

SIP proxy

SIP UA

m=audio 53000 RTP/AVP 0
c=IN IP4 192.169.0.12
a=...

m=audio 59451 RTP/AVP 0
c=IN IP4 130.233.160.19
a=rtcp:58005
a=...
Application Layer Gateways

Internet (via ISPs)

Site 1 Site 2

F NAT
R ALG
F Firewall
F NAT

SIP Application Layer Gateway (2)

- Many issues
  - Conflicts with security (e.g., signed or encrypted message contents)
    - TLS: client-side certificate check will not succeed
    - Snooping-only ALG may not even see the relevant information
    - Essence: ALG must become part of (trusted?) application infrastructure
  - ALG solution requires application-specific support for each application
    - Have to be upgraded for new applications
    - Application protocols may be complex (ALG builders may not get them right)
    - Feature race between application protocol designers (and implementers) and ALG vendors
  - Scalability
    - Functionality concentrated on single NAT/ALG box
    - Must be available on all entities along the path
  - Robustness
    - Intermediary boxes become single points of failure (unless state sharing protocol implemented)
      even if the application protocol itself supported failover
  - Reliability
    - Rewriting of protocol messages not robust with respect to extensions, future protocol versions etc.
Explicit Middlebox Signaling

MIDCOM

- Idea: Application-independent Control Protocol
  - SIP UA (or proxy) controls on-path intermediaries
    - Open pinholes, obtain NAT bindings etc.
  - Example: UPnP control of DSL routers
- Requirements specification: RFC 3304
- Abstract protocol semantics: RFC 3989
- Evaluation of Candidate Protocols: RFC 4097
  - Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
  - Realm-specific IP (RSIP)
  - Media Gateway Control (MEGACO)
  - Diameter
  - Common Open Policy Service (COPS)
Trivial Example: SOCKS (RFC 1928)

- SOCKS allows a client to communicate via a middlebox
  - Protocol between client “behind” middlebox and middlebox

- Operations
  - Bind to an externally visible address (and obtain this address) at the middlebox
  - Connect via a middlebox to a TCP peer
  - Create an association for a UDP flow via the middlebox
    - UDP-in-UDP tunneling of datagrams

- Authentication with the middlebox needed

- Usable for
  - IPv4-IPv6 translation
  - NAT and firewall traversal
MIDCOM Issues

- Needs to be standardized in the first place
- Must be supported by vendors (may lose their competitive edge)
  - If so, products need to become available and to be deployed
- Location problem: How to discover intermediaries?
- Organizational problems: Security Policy
  - Cannot control NAT box of public ISP
    - E.g., in a WLAN hot-spot
    - Motivation for the hot-spot operator?
  - Authentication of users and authorization of operations
- Must be really secure (authentication, authorization)
  - Hard to achieve
  - Example: UPnP is rather insecure today
  - And: third parties may misuse pinholes once created

NATs: Determining usable “outside” addresses in the endpoints

(Unilateral Self-Address Fixing, UNSAF)

- Maintain end-to-end idea as much as possible
- Examples: STUN, TURN, ICE
Reminder

- NATs translate “internal” transport addresses (IP address, port) to “external” ones
  - Using one or more “external” IP addresses
  - External address may or may not be public IP addresses
- NATs may be cascaded
- Address space re-use in different realms
  - 10.0.0.5 ≠ 10.0.0.5?
- Different NATs use different rules
  - How to choose the “next” external address
  - When to choose a new external address
    - Source IP address and port number mandatory
    - Optional: Destination IP address and port number
  - Which filter rules to install for inbound traffic
    - Traffic directed at an allocated port mapping
    - Traffic originating from a transport address a packet was previously sent to
  - Cleaning up NAT bindings
    - TCP: typically tied to connection state
    - UDP: typically handled via timeouts
    - Other protocols: may or may not be supported

UNSAF Considerations for NATs

- There is no uniquely determinable “outside” to NATs
- Addresses can only be determined relative to a specific point in the network
  - It may not be known “where” this point is
  - An UNSAF service may have a different viewpoint with respect to an entity and thus see a different “relative” address compared to the peer of the entity
- Enabling incoming traffic may circumvent other security measures
- Basing future operation on past observations is risky
- UNSAF services and middleboxes may increase brittleness
Simple Traversal of UDP Through NATs (STUN)

- Detect NAT type and public IP address
  - External server echoes observed source address and port
  - Optionally request IP address and/or port change for response

```
1. Echo source address, send from recv port
2. Client requested port change
3. Client requested address change
```

Received/dropped responses determine type of NAT

---

Simple Traversal of UDP Through NATs (STUN)

1. Binding request to STUN server 1

```
No Response?
- No UDP connectivity, give up
```

**Response**

```
- Server returns MAPPED-ADDRESS
  (48.7.29.160:4560)
- Client is behind NAT
```

But what type of NAT?

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Simple Traversal of UDP Through NATs (STUN)

2. Binding request to STUN server 1 with change IP and change port flags
   - Response?
     - Client is behind full cone NAT
   - No Response?
     - Repeat Test 1 (1')
     - Send Binding Request to server 2
     - Server 2 returns MAPPED-ADDRESS (48.7.29.160:4560)
       - Client is behind restricted/port restricted NAT
     - Server 2 returns other MAPPED-ADDRESS
       - Client is behind a symmetric NAT

3. Binding request to STUN server 1 with change port flag
   - Response?
     - Client is behind restricted NAT
   - No Response?
     - Client is behind port restricted NAT
   - Repeat transmissions because of potential packet loss
STUN Security

- Anybody could send UDP messages with faked IP addresses
  - Gives rise to numerous attacks

- Establish a shared secret between client and server
  - Performed via TLS (i.e., reliable and secured transport)
  - Server authenticated by means of certificate
  - Server issues temporary “username” and “password”
  - Used in subsequent UDP-based STUN binding requests for authentication

- Alternative: STUN client and server share a signaling relationship
  - E.g. a SIP dialog when the STUN server runs on the peer system
    - STUN server dynamically instantiated on each RTP or RTCP port
  - Leverage the trust previously established – no need for TLS connection

STUN Summary

- STUN provides a means for an application to traverse NATs
  - Detect existence of NATs
  - Detect type of NATs
  - Learn address bindings and usable public address
  - Intended for enabling peer-to-peer communication in NAT scenarios

- Not a complete solution
  - Symmetric NATs still a problem
  - Does not help if both peers are behind NATs

- Approach to deal with symmetric NATs
  - Run STUN server with each media endpoint
    - (on each RTP/RTCP port)
  - Does not help if both endpoints are behind different NATs
Traversing Using Relay NAT (TURN)

- Idea: Provide forwarding service in the public internet
  - Client behind NAT has single connection to TURN server
  - Server forwards incoming packets destined for TURN client
    ➔ Relay NAT
  - Protocol-agnostic – no ALG needed
  - Authentication to prevent DoS-attacks (similar to STUN)

**TURN Details**

Client

- NAT
  - Allocate (UDP)
  - Resp (IP Addr, port)
  - Send (dst=1, data)
- Data Ind. (src=1, data)
- Data Ind. (src=2, data)
- SetActive (dst=1)
- Allocate (refresh)...

TURN server

- Data packet
- Data packet
- Data packet
- Peer 1 locked down

Peers

- 1
- 2
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE)

- Networks with segmented connectivity, different address realms
  - Try to find optimal connection between endpoints
  - Use relays only if necessary
  - Deal with the issue of ambiguous addresses (e.g., 10.0.0.5)
  - Support for STUN and TURN
- draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-08.txt
- Just a short-term solution on the road to middle-box control
- Applies to media path, not signaling
  - But signaling must be aware of ICE (specific SDP attributes)
  - Poor default behavior for non-ICE clients
- Abstract signaling model
  - Fits SIP, H.323, RTSP and similar protocols

Operation

- Idea: peers exchange lists of transport addresses, mutual connectivity tests
- Clients must detect own transport addresses
  - The more, the better
  - Local interfaces (including private addresses, e.g. in 10/8 net)
  - Detection using "external" reflectors (e.g. STUN, TURN)
  - Assigned tunnel addresses (e.g. PPTP)
- Clients run STUN servers on every published transport address
  - Explicit keep-advives for NAT binding
  - Shared with media streams
ICE Operation

Gather addresses
Offer
Answer
STUN checks
Offer
Answer
Media streams

ICE: Address Gathering

Local: 10.0.1.19:51000, 10.0.5.12:51002
STUN-derived: 130.233.99.70:58000, 130.233.99.70:58090
TURN-derived: 130.149.25.97:63673
ICE: Address Gathering

Local: 10.0.1.19:51000, 10.0.5.12:51002
STUN-derived: 130.233.99.70:58000, 130.233.99.70:58090
TURN-derived: 130.149.25.97:63673

Design Aspects for Application Protocols (1)

- Operation without specific support from middleboxes
  - Guidelines for application protocol design for NATs: RFC 3235
    - Fairly general statements of limited usefulness (nothing really new in 2002)
    - Don’t send addresses in the payload
    - Avoid session bundles
    - Session bundles originate from the same end (typically the client)
    - Prefer connection-oriented transport
    - STUN, TURN, ICE: one solution set preserving end-to-end model

- Frequent “fallback” position: tunneling through HTTP (port 80)
  - This SHOULD NOT be the default option — may subvert security
  - Endless race between firewall vendors and application designers
  - “Smart” firewalls analyzing port 80 contents may have undesired side effects
  - The same applies to other well-known ports
Design Options for Application Protocols (2)

- If you want to work with ALGs
  - Design your protocol “in the open” (publish it!)
    - Need to motivate middlebox vendors to support it — or forget about it
  - Self-describing (ideally per packet!) traffic; easy to parse
  - Separate communicated transport addresses from other protocol parameters
  - If needed, avoid securing these (only) in the signaling protocol
    - Move validating towards the dynamically established transport instead
  - Perform in-band protocol validation and negotiation (within a session)
    - Minimize cross-session dependencies

- Communication architecture
  - Make use of representative nodes (“servers”, “proxies”, “super-nodes”, etc.) if possible and useful for the application
  - But beware of introducing additional points of failure, scaling issues, etc.
    - And the need for operations and management

Design Options for Application Protocols (3)

- Protocol design itself
  - Don’t fragment
  - Introduce additional (application layer) demultiplexing
    - To reduce the need for transport bundles
  - Avoid communicating addresses in the payload if possible
  - Otherwise: make use of UNSAF and/or middlebox traversal mechanisms as applicable
    - Using STUN, TURN, ICE requires demultiplexing e.g. STUN and application protocol messages on the same transport address ("socket")
    - Negotiation protocol needed (currently ICE only specified for SDP and offer/answer)
  - Minimize brittleness
    - Use minimal number of addresses
    - Observe and deal with communication failures
  - Be careful with assumptions
    - (non-)existence of middleboxes; operation of a middlebox
    - Which side of the middlebox you are on