Security building blocks: cryptology

Markus Peuhkuri

2006-03-21

Lecture topics

- Cryptology
- Encryption
- Secure hash

Security and cryptology

- Information security = crypto?
- A significant art by itself
  ⇒ not something average M.Sc (Eng) must master
- Cryptography only a part of solution
- One need to know
  - which cryptographic methods to select
  - how to use those (and how *not to use*)
- Significant development in last 30, 10 years

What we like to do?

1. Conceal information
2. Verify information integrity
3. Make sure that we have access to information

- The first two are (somewhat) served with cryptology
- For the third one cryptography *may* help — and *may* harm
  - because of how many security protocols are designed, DoS with cryptographic methods can be easy: for example in initial handshake the server may need to do complex calculations to determine that the other party is not authorised.

Terminology

Plaintext $\mathcal{M}$ is information we want to protect

Ciphertext $\mathcal{C}$ is protected form of $\mathcal{M}$

Enciphering transforms plaintext to ciphertext

Deciphering transforms ciphertext to plaintext

Key $\mathcal{K}$ is used to decipher ciphertext

Public key $\mathcal{K}_p$ anyone can have access to

Secret key $\mathcal{K}_s$ only owner may have access to

Initialisation Vector $\mathcal{IV}$ is known parameter

Message digest $\mathcal{H} = h(\mathcal{M})$, fixed length value

Attacks to defeat cryptography

ciphertext only is known, and one tries to find the corresponding plaintext (and the key)

known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext is known: one tries to find the key

chosen plaintext attack: attacker can feed plaintexts of one's choice to the system and learn corresponding ciphertexts

Kerckhoffs' six design principles

1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable;
2. It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience;
3. Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written notes, and changeable or modifiable at the will of the correspondents;
4. It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence;
5. It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the concourse of several people;
6. Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application, that the system be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to observe.

The more secrets the system has, the more brittle it is. A key is the easiest component to change. This principle is also known as Shannon's Maxim [3].

Design principles

- Confusion
  - complex relationship between $\mathcal{K}$ and $\mathcal{C}$
  - e.g. substitution
- Diffusion
  - no statistical relationship between $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{C}$
  - one-bit change in $\mathcal{M}$ results change in every bit in $\mathcal{C}$ with $P = \frac{1}{2}$
  - avalanche effect
  - e.g. transposition

Ciphers

- Substitution cipher
  - plaintext $\mathcal{M}$ enciphers always to $\mathcal{C}$ with key $\mathcal{K}$
  - Caesar cipher: $\mathcal{C} = (\mathcal{M} + \mathcal{K}) \bmod 26$, $\mathcal{K} = 3$
  - modern block ciphers (block size 64 bits(8 bytes: $1.8 * 10^{19}$ different blocks) or more)
- One-time pad
  - unbreakable cipher (Vernam cipher)
  - *if* $\mathcal{K}$ used *only once*
  - $\mathcal{K}$ as long as $\mathcal{M}$

  - stream ciphers emulate
- Message digests
  - take arbitrary long $\mathcal{M}$ producing fixed-length digest $\mathcal{D}$

Block ciphers

- Few basic types
  - SP-networks (substitution-permutation networks)
  - Feistel ciphers
    - data halved, halves mixed with round function
- Operation modes

  electronic code book (ECB) used as substitution cipher
  - same $\mathcal{M}$ encrypts to the same $\mathcal{C}$ with same $\mathcal{K}$
  - vulnerable to cut-and-splice

  cipher block chaining (CBC) uses previous ciphertext $\mathcal{C}_{i-1} \oplus \mathcal{M}_i$
  - initialisation vector $\mathcal{IV}$[1]
    $\Rightarrow$ randomises first block $\mathcal{IV} \oplus \mathcal{M}_1$
  - still possible to defeat integrity

  output feedback (OFB) used as stream cipher $\mathcal{K}_1 = \{\mathcal{IV}\}_k$, $\mathcal{K}_i = \{\mathcal{K}_{i-1}\}_k$

  counter encryption $\mathcal{K}_i = \{\mathcal{IV} + i\}_k$
  - possible to parallelise for high-speed processing

  cipher feedback $\mathcal{C}$ is encrypted with $\mathcal{K}$ and XOR with plaintext
  - recovers from transmission errors

  message authentication code (MAC) to verify integrity
  - CBC mode, all but latest block discarded: keyed hash function

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- Feistel cipher
- Developed by IBM in 1970s, modified by NSA, federal standard (FIPS-46) 1976
- Key length 56 bits
  $\Rightarrow$ too short nowadays
  - 1998 EFF "Deep Crack" (cost USD250,000) broke DES challenge in 56 hours with brute force
- Four weak and 16 semi-weak keys
- Still usable as Triple DES (3DES)
  - $\mathcal{C} = \mathrm{DES}_{\mathcal{K}_3}(\mathrm{DES}^{-1}_{\mathcal{K}_2}(\mathrm{DES}_{\mathcal{K}_1}(\mathcal{M})))$
  - efficient key length 112 bits, while some advertise 168 bit key The second step could be also DES encryption, but on some hardware-based systems decrypting gives a better performance.

[1] Can be embedded into message

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- SP-network
- Subset of Rijndael (fixed block length 128 bits)
- Efficient also on small systems (smartcards etc.)
  - AES-128 about as fast as DES[2]
    ⇒ 3 times faster than Triple DES
- Key length 128, 196 or 256, the shortest not for Top Secret in US
- FIPS-197

Stream ciphers

- Cryptographic secure pseudo-random number generator
- XOR by bit or by byte (synchronous stream cipher)
- Popular in communications
  - byte-sized: no need to pad blocks
  - simple implementation on hardware: for example A5/1 needs only three shift registers (19, 22, and 23 bits) and some XOR ports
- Vulnerable to bit-fiddling: if one knows that an interesting bit at position N should be inverted, one can just change it from the bit stream. On the other hand this provides some protection from transmission errors: with block ciphers one will end with a large block of invalid data.
- RC4 used in SSL, WEP
- A5/1 and A5/2 in GSM
- Both have security problems, A5/2 very weak

Asymmetric ciphers

- Symmetric ciphers provides secrecy only if one can communicate the key to other party secretly
  ⇒ key management becomes problem
- Use a problem that is
  - easy to construct
  - hard solve without
  - specific knowledge (= private key)
- NP-complete problems are good candidates. However, not every NP-complete problem is suitable for asymmetric cipher. For example, knapsack problems were thought to be good algorithms, but they have been broken.
- Can be used to provide a digital signature without third party

[2] On modern 32-bit computer.

RSA

[3]

- Factoring large numbers is hard
- Public key:
  - $n = pq$, p and q large primes
  - e relatively prime for $(p-1)(q-1)$
- Private key:
  - $d = e^{-1} \bmod ((p-1)(q-1))$
- Encrypting: $c = m^e \bmod n$
- Decrypting: $m = c^d \bmod n$

ElGamal

- Discrete logarithm in a finite field
- $y = g^x \bmod p$, prime p, random numbers $g < p$, $x < p$
- Public key: y, g, and p
- Private key: x
- Signature: random k (relatively prime for $p-1$, must be kept secret)
  - $a = g^k \bmod p$, solve b from $M = (xa + kb) \bmod (p-1)$
  - verify: $y^a a^b \text{mod} = g^M \bmod p$
- Encrypting: $a = g^k \bmod p$, $b = y^k M \bmod p$
- Decrypting: $M = b/a^x \bmod p$

Message digest functions

- Calculating a signature for a long document
  - time-consuming
  - as large (or larger) than the original document
- Verifying document integrity
  - signed digest
  - digest stored or communicated securely. For example, there can be a list of hashes of all system files on read-only media. If any of those is modified, it may be detected by comparing hashes.
- Cryptographic checksum function
  1. $\mathcal{H} = h(\mathcal{M})$ easy to compute
  2. infeasible to find $\mathcal{M}$ for given $\mathcal{H}$
  3. infeasible to find $\mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{M}'$ such that $h(\mathcal{M}) = h(\mathcal{M}')$
  4. an one-bit change in $\mathcal{M}$ should result every bit in $\mathcal{H}$ to change with $P = \frac{1}{2}$
- Birthday attack: $2^{\frac{n}{2}}$

[3] Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman

Secure hash algorithms in use

MD5 designed in 1991

- 128-bit
- some weakness found, maybe insecure for demanding applications

SHA-1 federal standard 180-2

- 160-bit
- original SHA (1993, SHA-0) vulnerable to 2^{39}
- SHA-1 vulnerable to a collision at 2^{63}
- longer versions (SHA-2) to 512 bits; not analysed in depth

RIPEMD-160 European algorithm

- 160-bit, also longer ones

HMAC: keyed hash

- Used for authentication with shared secret[2]
- $h(\mathcal{K} \oplus opad || h(\mathcal{K} \oplus ipad || \mathcal{M}))$
  - *ipad* and *opad* select different bits[4] from $\mathcal{K}$
- Protects $\mathcal{K}$ from eavesdropping

What cipher to choice

- How to distribute keys
- What trust model one has
- Any performance constrains
- Using public algorithms gives comfort, as if there is a weakness, it will be publicly known with good probability.
- Beware snake oil: unbreakable, certified, technobabble, secret, military grade, ... [1]

Failures on ciphers

- Even if you take a good algorithm, wrong use may result bad security
- A bad algorithm is always bad security
- *Do not modify* a cryptographic algorithm: adding rounds or increasing the key length may result in a weaker algorithm.
- Check that you use cryptographic *as planned*
  - stream ciphers: use different $\mathcal{IV}$ each time
  - MS Office uses same $\mathcal{IV}$ for all saves of same document

[4] *ipad*=0x36..., *opad*=0x5c...

WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy

- Use of encryption optional
  ⇒ system administration failures
- No key management: use of shared key
- CRC-32 used for integrity check
  - linear algorithm: possible to fix changes with stream cipher bit-fiddling
- $\mathcal{IV}$ only 24 bit
  - wraps around in a day (or faster)
  - shared key ⇒same $\mathcal{IV}$ by multiple hosts
- Attacks
  - statistical analysis for packets with the same $\mathcal{IV}$
  - injecting known traffic e.g. from the Internet enables decrypting packets with the same $\mathcal{IV}$
  - if the RC4 stream for one packet is known, it is possible to send encrypted packets with the same $\mathcal{IV}$
  - bit-fiddling attacks to change the content or the destination of packets
  - bad software key generators: key space may be 2^{21}, not 2^{64}
  - dictionary attack on keys, like for passwords. You can make attack passively just by capturing a number of packets and trying different passphrases to find out the key.

Key lengths: how long is safe

- How long time the information must stay secret
- Longer key results in more computational load: limits available communication speed or increases power consumption on mobile devices.
- Symmetric ciphers
  - risk: a fundamental weakness will be found or advances in computing
  - 64 bit cipher broken: RSA RC5 challenge
  - 128 bits should be OK
  - 196 – 256 bit AES key for Top Secret
- Asymmetric ciphers
  - risk: advances in mathematics or in computing
  - 576-bit key factored
  - RSA key lengths and same-level symmetric keys

prime bits	symmetric
1024	80
2048	112
3072	128
15360	256

  - elliptic curves: double to symmetric keys
- Message digests
  - SHA-1 currently used, retried by 2010
  - SHA-2 algorithms unsure

Some performance figures for 1 KiB blocks

Algorithm	relative speed
DES CBC	1000
RC4	3638
AES 128	921
AES 196	796
AES 256	705
RSA 1024 sign	7 / 1000
RSA 1024 verify	132 / 1000
RSA 4096 sign	0.2 / 1000
RSA 4096 verify	12 / 1000
MD5	4992
SHA-1	3360

Summary

- Bits do not matter (much)
- Important
  - to select the right algorithm for the right use
  - to use algorithm in the right way
- Hardware used may impose some limitations
- For many uses, the performance is not a real problem

References

[1] Matt Curtin. Snake oil warning signs: Encryption software to avoid. Web page, referred 2006-03-18, April 1998. URL:`http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html`.

[2] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti. HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication. Request for Comments RFC 2104, Internet Engineering Task Force, February 1997. (Informational). URL:`http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt`.

[3] C.E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. *Bell Sys. Tech. Journal*, 28:656–715, 1949.